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Retroactive Liability for Clean-up of
Hazardous Waste in Atlas v. United
States: The Nuclear Industry's Failed
Attempt to Make the Government Pay
INTRODUCTION
In recognition of the potential long-term health and environ-
mental hazards connected with mill tailings,' the sand-like resi-
due resulting from the production of enriched uranium and
thorium, Congress enacted the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation
Control Act of 1978 (UMTRCA). 2 Under Title I of UMTRCA
the federal government is liable for the stabilization and decom-
missioning of tailings at sites which were inactive at the time of
the statute's enactment.' Title II of UMTRCA, however, places
responsibility for decontamination, decommissioning, and rec-
lamation on licensees of active facilities. 4 Pursuant to UMTRCA,
requirements for stabilization of active sites were established by
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA).5
Because approximately one ton of uranium ore must be
milled to extract a few pounds of uranium that can be used as
an energy source, huge piles of unregulated tailings accumulated
Mill tailings contain various toxic and radioactive elements, including radium,
considered to be the greatest threat to public health and safety. Radon gas, a carcinogen,
is emitted when radium decays. Tailings will continue to produce radon for up to 100,000
years. Magee, The Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978, 9 EcoLoGY
L.Q. 801 (Summer 1980). The potential health effects from exposure to uranium mill
tailings were debated when Congress considered the Uranium Mill Tailings Control Act
of 1978. See H.R. REP. No. 1480, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 25, 26, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEws 7451-53.
1 Title I is codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7901-7942 (1982), amended by Uranium
Mill Tailings Remedial Action Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-616, 102
Stat. 3192. Title II amended or added sections to 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2011-2296 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986).
3 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7912-7919.
- 42 U.S.C.A. § 2113.
1 The regulations are found at 40 C.F.R. pt. 92 (1988); 10 C.F.R. pts. 40, 150
(1989).
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at milling sites6 for some thirty years before Congress, and
consequently the NRC and the EPA, addressed the problem.7
Bringing the tailings and mill sites into compliance with the
regulations has been an expensive undertaking. In Atlas v. United
States' several corporations who produced uranium and thorium
under a contractual procurement program of the Atomic Energy
Commissioff (AEC) 9 sought recovery of those compliance costs
from the federal government.' 0 Affirming the United States
Claims Court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims," the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rejected argu-
ments for equitable reformation of contract based on mutual
mistake, 2 breach of express contract, 3 breach of implied-in-fact
contract, 4 and unconstitutional taking under the fifth amend-
ment. 5 This Comment examines each of these arguments and
the court's rationale for dismissing all of them.
I. Atlas Corp. v. United States: BACKGROUND AND FACTS
In order to procure domestic sources of atomic energy for
the military, in the late 1940s the ABC launched a program to
encourage private companies to produce uranium and thorium
H.R. REP. No. 1480, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 11, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 7433-34.
7 The uranium milling industry developed in the United States in the late 1940s
when the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), seeking domestic sources of atomic energy
for the military, encouraged private companies to contract with the federal government
for the production of uranium and thorium. The tailings produced in the milling process
were not regulated until the enactment of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control
Act of 1978 [hereinafter cited as UMTRCAJ.
s 15 Cl. Ct. 681 (1988), aff'd, 895 F.2d 745 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, No.
89-1705, - U.S. -, III S.Ct. 46 (Oct. 1, 1990).
9 The AEC was abolished and succeeded by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) and the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) by Pub. L.
93-438 (Oct. 11, 1974), 88 Stat. 1237, codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 5814. The ERDA was
succeeded by the Department of Energy by Pub. L. 95-91 (Aug. 4, 1977), 91 Stat. 565,
codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 7151.
-0 Atlas, 15 Cl. Ct. 681. In addition to Atlas Corporation, plaintiffs included Kerr-
Mcgee Chemical Corporation, Quivira Mining Company, Western Nuclear, Inc., Atlantic
Richfield Company, Umetco Minerals Corporation, Union Carbide Corporation, Home-
stake Mining Company of California, Inc., and Pathfinder Mines Corporation.
1 The claims court dismissed all the plaintiffs' claims over which it had jurisdic-
tion, and transferred constitutional equal protection and ex post facto claims to the
United States Disctrict Court for Colorado. Atlas, 15 Cl. Ct. at 692.
Atlas, 895 F.2d at 750.
Id. at 753.
4 Id. at 754.
1 Id. at 756.
[VOL. 6:275
RETROACTIVE LiAILrrY
for the government. The plaintiffs in Atlas had either contracted
with the AEC under that program or acquired the rights and
duties of corporations that did so, and they held licenses for
active mill sites when UMTRCA took effect.' 6 In the mid-1960s
a commercial market for uranium products began to develop.'
7
Consequently, the mill tailings generated by production under
the AEC contracts have been commingled with those resulting
from private commercial contracts."
The price provisions of the AEC contracts were individually
negotiated and thus varied. However, in each case the price
provisions represented a fixed price per pound delivered, based
on forecasted production costs and reasonable profits.' 9 It was
not until after the contract period, which extended from 1950
to 1970, that the hazardous nature of the radon gas emissions
of mill tailings was discovered and addressed by Congress and
federal agencies. 20 Title I of UMTRCA assigned the federal
government responsibility for obviating the hazards at milling
sites which were inactive in 1978;2I Title II placed the burden on
licensees of active sites.2 Therefore, subsequent to the expiration
of the government contracts, the uranium and thorium producers
were subjected to retroactive liability for stabilization of the mill
tailings, at considerable expense. The plaintiffs in Atlas sought
recovery from the federal government only for those costs as-
sociated with stabilizing the tailings generated under the AEC
contracts, not those resulting from uranium production under
commercial contracts .23
II. ARGUMENTS RAISED BY THE Atlas PLAINTIFFS
A. The Contract Claims
The plaintiffs set forth three distinct theories for recovery of
costs from the government under contract law. None proved to
be successful.
16 Id. at 747-748.
I, d. at 748 (Under the Atomic Energy Acts of 1946 and 1954, only the federal
government could own uranium products; but beginning in 1964, producers were per-
mitted to sell their uranium products to private parties.).
Atlas, 895 F.2d at 748.
" Atlas, 15 CI. Ct. at 685.
See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
21 42 U.S.C.A., §§ 7912-7919.
- 42 U.S.C.A., § 2113.
Atlas, 895 F.2d at 748-49.
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1. Contract Reformation Under the Doctrine of Mutual
Mistake
The plaintiffs alleged that the parties to the uranium and
thorium contracts made a mutual mistake regarding the health
hazards and necessary disposal of the mill tailings. 24 Under the
equitable theory that such a mistake requires reformation of
contract, they asserted *that the government should pay for the
costly stabilization and decommissioning measures taken in re-
sponse to UMTRCA. 25
The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis with
the elements that comprise a claim for mutual mistake. These
include:
(1) the parties to the contract were mistaken in their belief
regarding a fact;
(2) that mistaken belief constituted a basic assumption un-
derlying the contract;
(3) the mistake had a material effect on the bargain; and
(4) the contract did not put the risk of the mistake on the
party seeking reformation. 26
The court focused on the first element and determined that
the plaintiffs' claim for reformation must fail because it alleged
no such mistake of fact.27 There must be an erroneous belief as
to an existing fact for a mutual mistake to occur. However, the
Atlas plaintiffs could not show an erroneous belief as to an
existing fact because at the time of the contracts the parties were
not aware of the existence of the hazards posed by the mill
tailings. Thus the court held that the parties could not have
formed a mistaken belief as to those hazards.n
Because there was no mutual mistake, the plaintiffs' claim
for reformation was properly dismissed. "The purpose and func-
tion of the reformation of a contract is to make it reflect the
true agreement of the parties on which there was a meeting of
the minds. '"29 Reformation may not be used to enforce terms to
4 Id. at 749-50.
2 Id. at 750.
Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 151-52, 155 (1981);
National Presto Indus. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99, 106-12 (Ct. CI. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 962 (1965).
Atlas, 895 F.2d at 750.
n' Id.




which there was no agreement.3 0 The ABC could not have agreed
to any terms concerning the costs of stabilizing the mill tailings,
because neither it, nor any of the plaintiffs, knew of the existence
of hazards which would require such measures. Hence, there
was no meeting of the minds on that point, and no reformation
of the contracts was necessary.'
The court in Atlas went on to distinguish several cases in
which reformation of contract was permitted, noting that in
each of them the parties to the contracts (1) recognized the
existence of a fact upon which an agreement could be reached,
and (2) formed an erroneous belief concerning that fact.3 2 For
example, in National Presto Indust., Inc. v. United States,33
reformation of contract was allowed. In that case the United
States Army contracted with National Presto for the procure-
ment of artillery shells using a new method of production. The
parties discussed the possibility of the need for equipment and
an additional turning step in the process to shave imperfections
in the steel shells.3 4 Although National Presto thought the step
should be included, the Army decided it would not be necessary,
and the parties agreed to proceed without it." As it turned out,
they were mistaken, and National Presto incurred difficulties
and expenses adding the step to the process after production was
under way.36 In determining that the contract should be reformed
so that the government shouldered a portion of the additional
costs, 37 the court found that the parties made a mutual mistake
regarding the necessity of the turning equipment and procedure,
and the time and effort required to discover it. 8
3 CoRtni oN CONTRACTS § 614 at 723 (1960).
Atlas, 895 F.2d at 750.
32 Id. at 751. The Atlas court briefly discusses National Presto, 338 F.2d 99
(mistaken belief that additional equipment would not be needed to perform the contract);
and R.M. Hollingshead Corp. v. United States, 111 F. Supp. 285 (Ct. Cl. 1953)
(erroneous belief that DDT would remain clear when stored in metal containers). The
court also cites Southwest Welding & Mfg. Co. v. United States, 373 F.2d 982 (Ct. Cl.
1967) (mistaken belief as to price of steel); Walsh v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 589,
(Ct. Cl. 1952) (erroneous belief as to minimum wage rate); Aluminum Co. of America
v. Essex Group, Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (erroneous belief that the
Wholesale Price Index would accurately reflect certain contract costs).
3 338 F.2d 99 (Ct. CI. 1964).
-, National Presto, 338 F.2d at 101.
" Id. at 101-102.
Id. at 102.
I d. at 112.
Id. at 107.
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The Atlas court was able to distinguish National Presto
because in that case "[a]lthough the parties did not know of the
need for the additional equipment, they clearly recognized that
the equipment might be needed." 3 9 In contrast, the parties in
Atlas did not know that the mill tailings were hazardous, and
therefore they did not recognize that costly measures might be
needed to abate the problem. Thus, the court held, because the
parties did not recognize that fact, they could form no mistaken
belief about it.
The claims court in Atlas found "[t]here was no mutual
mistake, as the existence of the hazard was not knowable at the
time of the negotiations." 4 On appeal, the plaintiffs relied on
Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group4 and argued that
reformation can be granted regardless of whether the mistaken
facts were knowable when the contracts were negotiated and
executed.42
In Aluminum Co. the parties executed a contract for the
production of aluminum. 43 The price provisions were based on
an escalation formula tied to the Wholesale Price Index (WPI)
to determine Aluminum Co. ("ALCOA")'s non-labor produc-
tion costs." After the parties had studied the suitability of the
WPI as an objective index of those costs, they formed the
assumption that it would be an accurate indicator. 45 However,
due to the unforeseeable OPEC oil crisis, ALCOA's electricity
costs rose much more quickly than did the WPI. 46 ALCOA filed
suit against Essex, arguing that the parties were mutually mis-
taken in their estimate of the suitability of the WPI.47 The district
court found that ALCOA was entitled to reformation of con-
tract." Thus, reformation was granted even though the capacity
of the WPI to work as the parties expected was not knowable
at the time the aluminum contract was negotiated and executed.
Atlas, 895 F.2d at 751 (citation omitted).
Atlas, 15 CI. Ct. at 687.
4 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
42 Atlas, 895 F.2d at 751.
11 Aluminum Co. of America v. Essex Group, 499 F. Supp. 53, 55 (W.D.
Pa. 1980).
- Id. at 56.
4 Id. at 58.
6 MId.
41 Id. at 60.
48 Id. at 57.
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The Atlas court of appeals rejected the plaintiffs' argument
by pointing out the distinction between the existence and the
outcome of a fact.49 It illustrated that distinction with the famous
case of Sherwood v. Walker,50 in which the existence of the fact
as to whether a certain cow was barren was known; but the
outcome, that she was in fact fertile and pregnant, was not
known." Thus, in that case, relief was granted because there
was a mutual mistake as to the outcome of a fact known to
exist. Likewise, in Aluminum Co., the existence of the capacity
of the WPI was known at the time the contract was entered,
but the outcome was not knowable at that time, and both parties
formed a mistaken belief as to that outcome.
5 2
Atlas is unlike Aluminum Co. and Sherwood because the
existence of the fact of the hazard posed by the mill tailings was
not known when the contracts were entered. Thus, the parties
to the contracts in Atlas could not have formed any mistaken
belief as to the outcome of the hazard because they were unaware
of its existence.
The Atlas court of appeals concluded that the claims court
was correct in ruling that because the hazard associated with the
mill tailings was not knowable, there was no mutual mistake
concerning that fact. Thus, there could have been no agreement
as to the hazard which could be carried out through reformation
of contract. 53
2. Breach of Express Contract
All the plaintiffs except Atlas stated claims for breach of
express contract, despite their inability to identify any specific
provision that the government breached.- 4 They alleged that
under the contracts the producers were to be reimbursed for all
reasonable costs incurred in the 'milling of the uranium and
thorium and that tailings disposal was a reasonable cost covered
by certain contract provisions."
49 Atlas, 895 F.2d at 751.
, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887).
S1 Atlas, 895 F.2d at 751, discussing Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W.
919 (1887).
,2 Aluminum Co. and Sherwood are similar to National Presto, supra notes 32-38
and accompanying text. (In all three cases, unlike in Atlas, the fact at issue was
negotiated and discussed in executing the contracts.).
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The plaintiffs cited Alvin, Ltd. v. United States Postal
Service 6 for their contention that a specific provision concerning
stabilization of mill tailings was not necessary. In that case Alvin
leased property to the Postal Service under an agreement which
provided that the government would pay the "general real estate
taxes" on the land.57 After Proposition 13 passed, the California
Constitution was amended so that the services formerly funded
by "general real estate taxes" would in the future be funded by
"special assessments," though the total levies basically did not
change.58 The government refused to pay for the special assess-
ments, arguing that the letter of the contract did not require
such payment. The Alvin court of appeals looked to the intent
of the parties and concluded that the government was responsible
for the payment of the special assessments because the change
in the taxes was in name only, and it was understood by both
Alvin and the Postal Service that the government was to pay
such taxes, though the specific provision referred only to general
real estate taxes.
59
The court of appeals in Atlas distinguished Alvin, explaining
that in that case the contract contained a provision which could
be construed to include the new taxes, while in this case the
plaintiffs had failed to point to a provision which could be
construed to require the government to pay for stabilization of
the tailings. 60 The court rejected the claims for breach of express
contract because the plaintiffs failed to allege any provision
breached by the government in refusing to pay for stabilization
costs; the contracts contained negotiated fixed price provisions;
the plaintiffs did not assert that the government had not paid
the agreed prices; and the contracts did not contain any provision
for stabilization of tailings.
6'
One of the plaintiffs, Western Nuclear, tried another theory
for recovery on a claim of breach of express contract. It con-
tended that the government unilaterally modified the contract
when it enacted UMTRCA and adopted regulations to enforce
the Act. 62 The court of appeals quickly rejected this argument,
816 F.2d 1562 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
I3 d. at 1563.
" Id. at 1563-65.
, Id. at 1566.
Atlas, 895 F.2d at 753.
61 Id.
61 Id. at 754.
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as it is barred by the Sovereign Acts Doctrine. Actions taken by
the government as a sovereign are entirely separate from actions
taken by it as a contractor.63 When the government acts for the
public good, under its sovereign power, those acts cannot be
deemed to modify its contracts." Thus, because the government
was acting for the public good in passing UMTRCA and its
regulations, those acts could not be deemed to modify its con-
tract with Western Nuclear."
3. Breach of Implied-in-Fact Contract
Some of the plaintiffs claimed breach of implied-in-fact con-
tract, under two different theories of intent. Western Nuclear
asserted the parties intended that the government would bear
the additional costs of any acts it performed as a sovereign,
while Homestake and Pathfinder argued the parties intended
that the plaintiffs would be compensated for all production
costs, including tailings costs."6
The court made short work of dismissing these claims. First,
an implied-in-fact contract requires a meeting of the minds,
though it may be inferred from the parties' conduct as a tacit
understanding. 67 Because the costly stabilization of the tailings
now necessary was not considered by the parties when they
entered the contracts, there could have been no meeting of the
61 Jones v. United States, 1 Ct. CI. 383, 384 (1865) ("The two characters which
the government possesses as a contractor and as a sovereign cannot be thus fused; nor
can the United States while sued in the one character be made liable in damages for
[its] acts done in the other.").
" Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925) ("Ihe United States when
sued as a contractor cannot be held liable for an obstruction to the performance of the
particular contract resulting from its public and general acts as a sovereign."); Jones, I
Ct. CI. at 384 ("Whatever acts the government may do, be they legislative or executive,
so long as they be public and general, cannot be deemed specially to alter, modify,
obstruct or violate the particular contracts into which it enters with private persons.").
See also Tony Downs Foods Co. v. United States, 530 F.2d 367, 370-71 (Ct. Cl. 1976)
(where excess performance costs resulted from Executive Order, sovereign acts doctrine
barred price relief).
Atlas, 895 F.2d at 754.
" Atlas, 895 F.2d at 754.
', See Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592, 597 (1923). ("[A]n
agreement 'implied-in-fact,' founded upon a meeting of the minds, ... although not
embodied in an express contract, is inferred, as a fact, from the conduct of the parties
showing, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, their tacit understanding.").
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minds on that point.68 Second, an "implied contract ... must
be entirely unrelated to the express contract. The existence of
an express contract precludes the existence of an implied contract
dealing with the same subject. '" The plaintiffs sought to imply
a contract for the costs of stabilizing the tailings. But since the
express contracts dealt with production costs, the court found
that tailings costs were not entirely unrelated to the express
contracts. Therefore an implied contract that the plaintiffs were
to be compensated for tailings costs was precluded.
70
B. The Taking Claim
Under UMTRCA, a licensee is responsible for decontami-
nation, decommissioning, and reclamation of the mill and tail-
ings prior to terminating its license. 7' Western Nuclear contended
that the cost of compliance with the standards would exceed the
value of the mill; thus, the requisite compliance is an unconsti-
tutional taking under the fifth amendment.72 But the court was
unpersuaded by this argument.
The court of appeals began its analysis by observing that the
court has limited power to order compensation. That power
extends only to economic losses resulting from a government
"taking" of private "property" for public use. 73 The court then
stated that there is no "set formula" for establishing a taking
of property, and that "ad hoc, factual inquiries into the circum-
Atlas, 895 F.2d at 754.
6ITT Federal Support Services v. United States, 531 F.2d 522, 528 n.12 (Ct. Cl.
1976) (citations omitted).
70 Atlas, 895 F.2d at 755.
7. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2113.
Atlas, 895 F.2d at 756. The taking clause of the fifth amendment declares, "nor
shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
71 Atlas, 895 F.2d at 756. See also United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324
U.S. 499 (1945), which states:
The Fifth Amendment ... undertakes to redistribute certain economic
losses inflicted by public improvements so that they will fall upon the
public rather than wholly upon those who happen to lie in the path of the
project. It does not undertake, however, to socialize all losses, but those
only which result from a taking of property. If damages from any other
cause are to be absorbed by the public, they must be assumed by act of
Congress and may not be awarded by the courts merely by implication




stances of each particular case" are necessary. 74 The Atlas court
of appeals relied on the three factors of "particular significance"
described by the United States Supreme Court in Connolly v.
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp.7s for determining whether a taking
of property has occurred. These include: "(1) the character of
the government action; (2) the economic impact of the regulation
on the plaintiff; and (3) the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations. '"76 The
court in Atlas then applied each factor to Western Nuclear's
situation and determined that UMTRCA was not a compensable
taking.7
1. The Character of the Government Action
The government action involved in Atlas is the UMTRCA
regulatory scheme78 under which the plaintiffs must spend money
to stabilize and decommission the tailings and mills in order to
terminate their licenses. 79 The forced expenditure of funds for
the stated purposes is neither a physical invasions" nor a per-
manent appropriation of property8 by the government, but rather
is a safeguard for the public against radon emissions by the mill
tailings. 2 Congress found that the tailings "may pose a potential
and significant radiation health hazard to the public, and that
the protection of the public health, safety, and welfare" requires
their regulation. 3
Congress may regulate the use of property for public health
and safety reasons, pursuant to its police powers,8 and although
14 Atlas, 895 F.2d at 757; Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,
224 (1986).
7, 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
71 Atlas 895 F.2d at 756-757; Connolly, 475 U.S. at 224-25; Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
Atlas, 895 F.2d at 758.
7' See supra, notes 4 and 5 and accompanying text.
79 Atlas, 895 F.2d at 757; 42 U.S.C.A. § 2113.
"OA "taking" may more readily be found when the interference with prop-
erty can be characterized as a physical invasion by government than when
interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good.
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (citations omitted).
" In United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), the Court found a compensable
taking occurred when the government appropriated the airspace above plaintiffs' property
and thereby destroyed the use of the farm.
2 Atlas, 895 F.2d at 757.
83 42 U.S.C.A. § 7901.
4 Atlas, 15 Cl. Ct. at 689.
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a regulation may require private parties to spend money, no
unconstitutional taking has occurred. 8 In Connolly, the United
States Supreme Court indicated that a public program set up to
promote the common good, which interferes with private prop-
erty rights, is not a compensable taking." In that case a federal
statute required employers to pay more than their contracts
obligated them to pay when withdrawing from a pension plan. 7
The Court found that the requirement was not a taking, because
it was for the common good.8 -
Likewise, in Atlas, the plaintiffs were required by UMTRCA
to pay more than the contract price for clean-up and disposal
of the mill tailings. Because Congress was exercising its power
to protect the public health, safety and welfare when it enacted
UMTRCA," the court found that the requirment was not a
compensable taking. 90 Owners have an obligation to use property
in a way that does not cause injury to the general public, and
the government may enforce that obligation without compensat-
ing the private parties affected. 9' Thus, in Atlas, the plaintiffs
had an obligation to use their property in such a way that the
radioactive mill tailings did not injure the public, and Congress
has the power to enforce that obligation by requiring stabiliza-
tion and decommissioning without compensating those affected
by the law.
2. The Economic Impact of the UMTRCA Regulatory
Scheme
Western Nuclear complained that compliance with the UM-
TRCA requirements for stabilization and decommissioning of
the mill tailings would cost more than the mill was worth.92 The
court of appeals stated that comparing the cost of compliance
" See, e.g., Connolly, 475 U.S. at 226 ("Mhe mere fact that the employer must
pay money to comply with [an] Act [of Congress] is but a necessary consequence of
[the Act's] regulatory scheme.").
" Connolly, 475 U.S. at 225.
7 Id. at 221.
u Id. at 225.
" 42 U.S.C.A. § 7901.
10 Atlas, 895 F.2d at 757-58.
9, E.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491-92
(1987); Allied-General Nuclear Services v. United States, 839 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
Atlas, 895 F.2d at 758.
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with the value of the plaintiff's mill did not indicate the eco-
nomic impact of the Act. 93
The claims court in Atlas pointed out that UMTRCA's im-
pact on Western Nuclear is no more financially onerous than
the impact of other environmental protection measures on other
private parties. 94 For example, the Clean Air Act95 sets national
standards for permissible levels of air pollutants, and the fact
that the costs of compliance may be so high as to be economi-
cally unfeasible is not even a consideration." Hence, Congress
has the power to enact statutes with potentially devastating
financial effects, and the courts can provide no remedy for an
aggrieved party.9
The court of appeals determined that Western Nuclear's
allegations fell short of showing the kind of economic impact
that would support a finding of an unconsitutional taking.98
Similarly, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City,9 in which a landmark preservation ordinance was chal-
lenged, the United States Supreme Court found that the severity
of the impact of the regulation on the property owner's use of
the land was insufficient to effect a taking.100 In that case, Penn
Central submitted plans to a city commission for the construc-
tion of an office building atop Grand Central Terminal, but was
denied permission to go forward.' 0 ' The building had been des-
ignated as a city landmark,' °2 and thus fell within the develop-
ment restrictions of the city ordinance. The Court observed that
the law did not interfere with the owner's ability to make a
profit from its investment in the land. 03 The Terminal could
continue to operate as it had for many years, as a railroad
terminal with offices and concessions.
In Atlas, the court of appeals noted that Western Nuclear
had not alleged any government interference with its production
93 Id.
'" Atlas, 15 Cl. Ct. at 690.
-5 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
" Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256 (1976).
Lead Industries Assn. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980).
" Atlas, 895 F.2d at 758.
- 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
'0 Id. at 138.
o10 Id. at 116-17.
I0 d. at 115.
"4 Id. at 136.
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of uranium or its ability to make a profit operating the mill.'04
Thus, as in Penn Central, the regulations do not prevent the
licensee from continuing in its present use of the property, nor
do they make that use unprofitable. Therefore, Western Nuclear
had not shown an economic impact requiring compensation un-
der the fifth amendment.
3. Interference with Investment-Backed Expectations
Under the circumstances alleged,' °s the court of appeals con-
cluded that the only expectation Western Nuclear could have
had was that it would not be required to spend money to
minimize the health and safety hazards presented by the mill
tailings.' 0 The court went on to declare that expectation an
unreasonable commercial one.1°7
While the Atlas court did not set out a detailed analysis of
this factor, the discussion in Usery V. Turner Elkhorn Mining
Co.108 indicates that the Atlas court's conclusion was correct.
Like Atlas, Usery involved a statute that operated retrospec-
tively.'09 The law required coal operators to compensate former
employees disabled by pneumoconiosis, even if the employees
had terminated their connection with the industry prior to the
enactment of the statute." 0 The operators challenged the law
under the due process clause of the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution."' However, the Supreme Court's
reasoning in rejecting the argument is applicable to challenges
under the fifth amendment's taking clause as well.'
12
The coal operators in Usery contended that the statute im-
permissibly imposed liability on them for past acts that, at the
time they were completed, were legal and not known to be
10, Atlas, 895 F.2d at 758.
,01 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
,01 Atlas, 895 F.2d at 758.
a7 Id.
M 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
101 Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, amended by
Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-945 (1986).
110 Usery, 428 U.S.
- The due process clause of theafifth amendment states that "[no person shall] be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend.
V.
112 See Connolly, 475 U.S. at 223. ("Although [Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining
Co. was a] due process casea, it would be surprising indeed to discover now that ...
Congress unconstitutionally had taken the assets of the employern there involved.").
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dangerous." 3 The Court stated that "legislation readjusting rights
and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise
settled expectations .... This is true even though the effect of
the legislation is to impose a new duty or liability based on past
acts.""11 4 The Court justified the statute as a rational measure
which served the purpose of allocating costs generated by the
dangerous condition to those who had profited from the fruits
of the business." i
Likewise, in Atlas, the effect of UMTRCA regulations is to
impose retrospective liability for stabilizing mill tailings, even
though much of the residue was produced at a time when it was
legal and not known to be dangerous to do so. Thus, the Act
may upset the plaintiffs' expectations, but that does not make
it unlawful. The tailings have created a dangerous condition
because they emit radon gas, and UMTRCA addresses the spe-
cific need to minimize that hazard.
The nuclear industry has been highly regulated from its
inception under the AEC's procurement program." 6 The Atlas
court found that because the plaintiff does business in such a
regulated field, it cannot now object to continued regulations
adopted to achieve the legislative intent of Congress." 7 The Atlas
plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation that such regulations
would not be imposed. Thus, their imposition requires no com-
pensation under the fifth amendment.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs in Atlas v. United States"8 set forth several
good arguments" 9 in their attempt to escape the financial burden
presented by the UMTRCA regulatory scheme. But the court
did not allow any of the plaintiffs' claims to defeat the legislative
intent that licensees of uranium and thorium mills be required
"I Usery, 428 U.S. at 15.
"4 Id. at 15-16.
"I Id. at 18-19.
16 Atlas, 895 F.2d at 758.
117 Id. (citing Connolly, 475 U.S. at 227 and quoting FHA v. The Darlington, Inc.,
358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958)).
"I Atlas Corp. v. The United States, 15 CI. Ct. 681 (1988), aff'd, 895 F.2d 745
(Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, No. 89-1705, U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 46 (Oct. 1, 1990).
1" In addition to the claims discussed in this Comment, Western Nuclear presented
equal protection and ex post facto claims, which the claims court transferred to the
United States District Court for Colorado. Atlas, 15 Cl. Ct. at 692.
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to clean up the hazardous conditions they created. This decision
reaffirms the broad power of Congress to regulate industry for
the health, safety and welfare of the general public. Because the
court analyzed and rejected such a number of arguments, the
decision both demonstrates and strengthens the courts' ability to
deny relief to those whom Congress mandates must suffer the
consequences of their own actions.
Mary Boaz
